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the Roles of Knowledge Sources and Organizational 
Instruments for Knowledge Creation and Transfer 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Most recent research on the differentiated MNC has been taken up with 
knowledge flows between MNC units.  In contrast, we develop a view of the 
MNC as a knowledge structure where knowledge elements in MNCs are 
seen as being structured along a number of dimensions (e.g., 
complementarity, dispersal, sources of knowledge) that help determining the 
costs and benefits of knowledge transfer. Based on this conceptualization, we 
argue that MNC management through choices regarding organizational 
control, motivation and context can influence the development, 
characteristics and transfer of knowledge.  This further extends existing 
literature.  For example, in most of the literature, the characteristics of 
knowledge are seen as exogenous rather than endogenous variables.  
However, to the extent that management chooses a specific way of sourcing 
knowledge, it also implicitly chooses the characteristics of the sourced 
knowledge and the ease with which it can be transferred inside the MNC.  
This is because knowledge from different knowledge sources have different 
characteristics and are thus transferred at different cost. The six hypotheses 
that we draw from the main argument are tested against a unique and very 
rich dataset on subsidiary knowledge development (including information 
on the organizational setting, sources of subsidiary knowledge and the 
extent of knowledge transfer to other MNC-units) that has been constructed 
in connection with a cross-national project Centres of Excellence. The dataset 
covers more than 2.000 subsidiaries located in seven different European 
countries. 
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I. Introduction 
Within the last fifteen years, the role of knowledge and learning in gaining and 
sustaining competitive advantage has become a central area of research in a number 
of different fields, such as innovation studies, strategic management and 
international business.1   Yet, in spite of the present popularity of such “knowledge-
based” explanations it is fair to say that we are still some way from a satisfactory 
understanding of a number of the central aspects, mechanisms and contextual factors 
in the causal links between knowledge, learning, and competitive advantage.   We 
see two main, and closely related, problems.  First, rather little analytical effort has 
been devoted to understanding the ways in which knowledge is stratified, 
distributed, overlapping, complementary, etc.  in other words, structured  inside 
firms, and how this may influence competitive advantage. Second, there is a relative 
neglect of how organizational arrangements (e.g., the allocation of authority and 
decision rights inside firms) interact with the creation and use of knowledge, and 
how this may influence competitive advantage.  We see these two problems as 
closely related, because the structuring of knowledge inside firms is closely related to 
issues of organizational structure. Both problems arguably stem from a fundamental 
conceptual problem: Existing conceptualizations of a knowledge-based view of firms 
move on an extremely high level of abstraction, in which the finer details of 
organizational structure and structuring of knowledge inside firms are left out of the 
picture.    
  The literature that is perhaps least vulnerable to these critiques is recent work 
on the differentiated multinational corporation (MNC) (e.g., Hedlund 1986; Bartlett 
and Ghoshal 1986; Gupta and Govindarajan 1991, 1995, 2000). A number of 
contributions to this literature have indeed examined organizational aspects of the 
development, characteristics and transfer of knowledge.2 Among other results, this 
has led to a renewed conceptualization, understanding and appreciation of 
subsidiaries which are now seen as potential sources of MNC-wide strengths 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal 1986, 1989; Birkinshaw 1996; Forsgren, Pedersen and Foss 1999; 
Moore and Birkinshaw 1998; Holm and Pedersen 2000a).  However, in spite of some 
attention being devoted to the organizational dimensions of knowledge creation and 
transfer of knowledge, as well as an implicit recognition that knowledge is indeed 
structured inside firms, the literature is still only at a beginning with respect to 
understanding the central aspects, mechanisms, and contextual factors of the process 
                                                 
1  Much of this work has taken place in the context of resource-based (Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991), 
knowledge-based (Grant 1996), and evolutionary theories of the firm (Nelson and Winter 1982; 
Foss, Knudsen and Montgomery 1995). 
 
2   On the very abstract level, an influential argument is it that the differentiated MNC is more 
favorably positioned than the non-differentiated MNC or the purely domestic firm with respect to 
mobilizing knowledge in the development and renewal of competitive advantage because of its 
access to more (and more differentiated) knowledge sources (Hedlund 1986; Bartlett and Ghoshal 
1989). 
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of managing knowledge in MNCs, that is, creating and transferring knowledge, as 
well as the characteristics of knowledge. Progress on these matters seems 
handicapped, we shall argue, by the absence of a well developed conceptualization 
of the MNC as a knowledge-based entity. The present paper represents an attempt to 
contribute to remedying some of these weaknesses.   
 In accordance with what we see as the root problem, we begin by offering a 
conceptual development of the notion of the MNC as a knowledge-based entity.  We 
argue that the MNC knowledge structure may be understood in terms of such 
dimensions as the distinction between core and more peripheral systems of 
knowledge and beliefs, complementarities between knowledge elements, dispersal of 
knowledge, complexity of knowledge and tacit and explicit elements.  The MNC 
knowledge structure forms the backdrop to processes of creating, transferring and 
utilizing knowledge within the overall MNC network, co-determining their costs and 
the benefits. These processes are influenced by management decisions relating to 
organizational design (e.g., the relations between subsidiaries, or between 
subsidiaries and the center) and to the  sources of knowledge that subsidiaries tap 
into (Foss and Pedersen 2002). Underlying our reasoning is an overall 
conceptualization of the MNC organizational design problem as an dynamic 
optimization problem in which MNC management organizational instruments (i.e., 
the control variables) in such a way that 1) knowledge is optimally developed, 2) 
knowledge is optimally transferred, and 3) the optimal MNC-wide mix between tacit 
and explicit knowledge components is achieved (i.e., the state variables), all given the 
pre-existing MNC knowledge structure.    
 In our development of hypothesis from this overall conceptualization, we 
distinguish between knowledge sourced from the internal development of 
knowledge in the subsidiary and the MNC network, and knowledge sourced 
externally from network relations and from local clusters. We argue that the 
subsidiary choice of such knowledge sources can be influenced by MNC 
management. Specifically, we argue that the success of developing knowledge from 
such sources is influenced by the degree of autonomy that is granted to the 
subsidiary, as well as the extent to which interdependence with other MNC units is 
promoted.  Finally, we argue that the extent to which knowledge can be transferred 
within the MNC network reflects prior managerial choices with respect to the choice 
of source of knowledge and the way in which subsidiaries are organized. This is 
because the choice of knowledge sources influences the characteristics of knowledge 
(e.g., tacit vs explicit, perceived complementarities).   This is one way in which a 
knowledge structure view of the MNC serves to make the costs and benefits of 
knowledge transfer clearer.  
 In sum, our contribution in this paper are, on the overall level, to put forward a 
conceptualization of the MNC as a knowledge-based entity, focusing on the MNC 
knowledge structure, as well as to explicitly argue that the development, 
characteristics, sources, and transfer of knowledge may be influenced through 
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choices regarding organizational control, motivation and context. The empirical 
setting of this paper is the MNC as seen from the perspective of the subsidiary. The 
hypotheses that we draw from the main argument are tested on the basis of a unique 
and very rich dataset on subsidiary knowledge development (including information 
on the organizational setting, sources of subsidiary knowledge and the extent of 
knowledge transfer to other MNC-units) that has been constructed in connection 
with a cross-national project Centres of Excellence (Holm and Pedersen 2000a). The 
dataset covers more than 2.000 subsidiaries located in seven different European 
countries. 
II. Theoretical Model and Hypotheses 
In this section, we begin by arguing that there is a need for a knowledge structure 
approach to firms, including MNCs, and outline the rudiments of such an approach. 
On this basis, we then develop the theoretical arguments that intra-MNC knowledge 
creation and transfer are influenced by managerial choices relating to 1) the sources 
of knowledge, 2) organizational instruments and 3) the mix of tacit and explicit 
components in the overall MNC knowledge structure.  These determinants are 
placed in the context of a view of the MNC as a knowledge structure. We begin by 
briefly explaining this conceptualization and then discuss the determinants seriatim.  
The Need for a Knowledge Structure Approach to the Multinational Firm 
 It has now become almost axiomatic that knowledge and learning are at the 
root of understanding how competitive advantage is gained and sustained, an 
approach that is usually, implicitly or explicitly, founded on a “knowledge-based” 
conceptualization of the firm (as in Kogut and Zander 1992; Grant 1996). However, 
these conceptualizations usually move on a very high level of abstraction or 
aggregation that usually rule out a concern with the finer details of organizational 
structure and structuring of knowledge inside firms.3 For example, reference is 
sometimes made to organization-level “higher-order organizing principles” that exist 
for the purpose of easing organizational learning or “combinative capabilities” that 
create new applications of existing knowledge (e.g., Kogut and Zander 1993).  
However, these notions are neither carefully defined and elaborated, nor are they 
linked to organizational arrangements, notably, issues of internal organization 
(Nickerson and Zenger 2001). Because these conceptualizations are so highly 
abstract, conceptualizations of what are essentially derived phenomena must also be 
correspondingly abstract.   
                                                 
 
3  As an example, Casson and Wadeson (1999) argue that in most of the literature on knowledge 
transfer, it is assumed that whereas knowledge is extremely costly to transfer across markets, it is 
transferable at close to zero cost inside firms. Nickerson and Zenger (2001) argue that the 
knowledge-based literature is fundamentally confused on the rationale of firms: In some parts of 
the literature, firms exist to conserve on the costs of transferring knowledge (e.g., Conner and 
Prahalad 1996), while in other parts (e.g., Kogut and Zander 1992), firms exist to exploit the low 
costs of transferring knowledge inside a hierarchy. 
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 Consider the example of organizational learning.  As Kogut and Zander (1992) 
rightly argue, in principle any theory of (organizational) learning requires an 
underlying theory of (organizational) knowledge.  If this theory of organizational 
knowledge is highly abstract, or crude, this must also be the case for a derived theory 
of organizational learning. Thus, if the underlying theory of organizational 
knowledge abstracts from the structuring of knowledge inside firms, the derived 
theory of organizational learning cannot as a simple logical matter be cast in terms of 
changes in this structure.   In fact, we argue that it is hard to understand the nature 
and costs and benefits of organizational learning  of which knowledge transfer is 
an example  in the absence of an underlying theory of the organizational 
knowledge structure.  The clearer that underlying theory is, the better the 
understanding of the nature, costs and benefits of organizational learning will be.   
 With respect to the nature of organizational learning, it seems hard to 
meaningfully conceptualize the phenomenon in lieu of some prior notion of 
knowledge in firms being structured. Apart from the theoretically possible, but 
extreme and unrealistic, case where organizational learning takes the form of an 
equal increase in everybody’s knowledge stocks, organizational learning always 
involves some change in the way in which knowledge inside a firm is dispersed, or 
combinable, or overlapping, etc., in other words, changes in the ways in which 
knowledge is structured. Trivially, this is also the case of knowledge transfer.  
Understanding of the costs and benefits of knowledge transfer will be strengthened by 
paying more attention to how knowledge is structured across a firm, because the 
motive for knowledge transfer usually is the wish to somehow combine knowledge 
elements that have hitherto existed separately and the difficulties of knowledge 
transfer are at least partly related to the specific characteristics of the knowledge 
being held at the sending as well as the receiving organizational units.   
 Nevertheless, most work on knowledge-based theory of the firm tends to 
neglect the structuring of knowledge elements across the firm, although there are 
exceptions (such as Henderson and Cockburn 1994).   This is also the case for the 
recent literature on the differentiated MNC which attempts to concentrate almost 
entirely on knowledge flows, abstracting from the composition of knowledge 
elements across the MNC network (i.e., the MNC knowledge structure) (e.g., Gupta 
and Govindarajan 1991, 1995, 2000).4  While this may be adequate for some purposes, 
more attention to the structuring of knowledge across the MNC network will lead to 
an improved understanding of the net benefits of knowledge transfer.  In turn, this 
means that the implications for competitive advantage of knowledge flows will 
become clearer.  These implications have not been clearly spelled in the differentiated 
                                                 
 
4   A partial exception is a recent cottage industry which is taken up with understanding subsidiaries 
as potential sources of MNC-wide strengths (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1986, 1989; Birkinshaw 1996; 
Forsgren, Pedersen and Foss 1999), and perhaps even as “centers of excellence” (Moore and 
Birkinshaw 1998; Holm and Pedersen 2000a).  Even in this literature, however, the main analytical 
emphasis is on knowledge flows, and there is no underlying coherent notion of the MNC as a 
knowledge structure. 
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MNC literature.  This is because this literature takes the knowledge flow as the 
relevant unit of analysis, whereas what matters for competitive advantage is the 
deployment of knowledge knowledge stocks.  
 Moreover, in spite of its concern with knowledge flows, the differentiated MNC 
literature has not made much out of flows from the external environment to the 
subsidiaries, which is a manifestation of a broader neglect of the sources of subsidiary 
knowledge stocks (e.g., local networks, local universities, local markets, internal 
R&D, etc.).   These sources come more clearly into focus in a conceptualization of the 
MNC as a knowledge structure.   Furthermore, as we demonstrate later, an improved 
understanding of the costs and benefits of intra-MNC knowledge transfer also 
follows, because the choice of sources of knowledge conditions these costs and 
benefits.   
 Finally, although the differentiated MNC literature has not neglected 
organizational arrangements (e.g., Ghoshal, Korine and Szulanski 1994), concern with 
these issues has  in keeping with the overall thrust of this literature  almost 
exclusively concerned the organization of intra-MNC knowledge flows (e.g., Gupta 
and Govindarajan 1995).   Two comments are pertinent here.  First, in the literature, 
organizational arrangements are seen to reflect the characteristics of transferred 
knowledge (i.e., there is an underlying efficient alignment hypothesis).  It is not that 
organizational arrangements are chosen to influence the characteristics of knowledge 
(Gupta and Govindarajan 1995). Second, there are much wider implications of 
organizational arrangements for the understanding of the creation, use and transfer 
of knowledge within MNCs  implications that, however, only become visible if 
more attention is devoted to how knowledge is structured across the MNC network.   
In particular, we argue that MNC by means of organizational instruments can 
indirectly influence the characteristics of knowledge, for example, the proportion 
between tacit and explicit knowledge in their knowledge structures.  They can do so 
by influencing the subsidiary choice of knowledge sources, because these sources are 
associated with different mixes of tacit and explicit elements. A greater concern with 
how knowledge elements are structured across the MNC will bring the role of 
organizational arrangements as instruments to “work on” the MNC knowledge 
structure, that is, influencing the creation, utilization and transfer of knowledge, 
more clearly into the picture than has hitherto been the case.  
The MNC as a Knowledge Structure: Some Building Blocks 
 So far, we have made two fundamental and broad arguments.  First, we have 
argued that most existing literature on the relations between knowledge, learning, 
and competitive advantage is founded on a, at best, highly abstract view of firm 
knowledge, and that this unnecessarily constrains the domain of application of this 
literature.  Second, we have suggested that a view of firm knowledge should be one 
that builds on a conception of firm knowledge being structured. Both arguments 
apply to knowledge-based view of the firm in general, and therefore also to the 
recent differentiated MNC literature. The purpose of the present section is to add 
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content to the notion of knowledge structure by providing some building blocks for 
such a view.  
 The notion that firms may be understood in terms of knowledge structures (and 
not just knowledge assets) was probably first explicitly put forward by Lyles and 
Schwenk (1992).  They introduce the notion of an “organizational knowledge 
structure” to refer to shared beliefs at the organizational level about “… goals, cause-
and-effect beliefs, and other cognitive elements.”  However, firms are characterized 
by a differentiated consensus in these beliefs, so that in the firm’s “core” the degree 
of consensus is high, while in the “periphery” it is low. According to Lyles and 
Schwenk, it is mainly in the periphery that new perspectives are developed  an 
idea that relates to the recent discovery in the MNC-literature of the role of 
subsidiaries as sources of new ideas, perspectives, etc. (e.g., Moore and Birkinshaw 
1998; Holm and Pedersen 2000a).5 They further argue that the organizational 
knowledge structure is characterized by complexity which (somewhat unclearly) 
refers to “… the amount of information … within a knowledge structure” (p.163) and 
“… the degree to which cognitive units are interrelated” (p. 164), as well as by 
relatedness which refers to the degree of coupling (tight vs. loose) between elements 
in the core and periphery of knowledge structures.  Thus, Lyles and Schwenk think 
of organizational knowledge structures, first, entirely in cognitivist terms, and, 
second, as referring to mainly shared beliefs at the organizational level.  However, 
this view seems unnecessarily constraining, since, first, it seems to rule out tacit 
knowledge (which is hard to represent as an explicit belief about goals, cause-and-
effect relations, etc.), and, second, excludes those elements from the organizational 
knowledge structure that are not shared at the organizational level.  
 We adopt a broader and essentially simple conceptualization of the firm  
including the MNC   knowledge structure.  To get an idea of this, think of the 
overall MNC knowledge structure as a set of nodes and their connections, as in the 
toy example in Figure 1.   
XXXXXXXX Insert Figure 1 here XXXXXXXX 
The individual nodes refer to knowledge elements, for example, a marketing capability 
in a subsidiary in a certain country. The individual nodes are the elemental building 
blocks of our view of firm knowledge structures.  Nodes may be identical as when 
two subsidiaries exploit the same patent. Lyles and Schwenk’s notion of 
organizational knowledge structures can be represented as the set of identical nodes 
over subsidiaries and MNC headquarters (i.e., the small dark circles). Nodes may 
represent tacit (e.g., the colourless circles) or explicit knowledge, or, knowledge with 
or without public good character.  
                                                 
5  On the other hand, knowledge that is built in the context of the core is less costly to transfer to 
other parts of the MNC network than knowledge that arises in the periphery because it can rely on 
greater bandwidth communication channels (Heimann and Nickerson 2002).  Thus, there is a 
possible tradeoff between the novelty of ideas and the costs of communication. 
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 Nodes may also be connected (and they may not, e.g., the knowledge sets 
controlled by subsidiary x and y in Figure 1), for example, in terms of lateral or 
bilateral dependencies. It is such perceived dependencies that underlie intra-MNC 
knowledge transfers. More refined conceptualizations, representations and 
taxonomies of interdependencies can be easily developed (e.g., Thompson 1967: 15-
18; Buckley and Carter 1999).  The notion of complementarity (Milgrom and Roberts 
1990) is particularly helpful for conceptualizing interdependencies. Loosely, 
knowledge elements are complementary when there are gains from combining them 
(the degree of complementarity being measured by the size of the gain).  For 
example, knowledge elements pertaining to marketing controlled by one subsidiary 
(or MNC headquarters) may be a useful addition to existing marketing knowledge in 
another subsidiary, so that the relevant knowledge elements are additive (Buckley 
and Carter 1999).  Or, subsidiary knowledge may be an input prior to the building of 
knowledge in another part of the MNC, as when knowledge of local tastes are 
transferred to centralized R&D functions, so that the relation of complementarity is 
sequential (ibid.).  Finally, dependencies may go both ways.  For example, knowledge 
gained from combined marketing knowledge in a number of subsidiaries may be 
transferred back to these as best practice knowledge. Or, strategies and actions based 
on knowledge elements in different MNC units may be interdependent, thus 
requiring coordination (what Buckley and Carter 1999 call “complex 
complementarity”).  
 The perceived net benefits of combining complementary knowledge elements 
depend on three elements.  First, net benefits depend on the characteristics of the 
relevant knowledge elements, that is, how complementary they are, what kind of 
complementarity is involved, overlap, tacitness, etc.  Second, they depend on the 
governance costs implied by these characteristics, in terms of costs of motivation and 
coordination (Buckley and Carter 1999).  Third, net benefits depend on the costs of 
transfer (personal or codified communication, embodied transfer). For example, 
transferring highly tacit knowledge elements under conditions of complex 
complementarity is likely to be very taxing for the organization in terms of 
governance and transfer costs.  The presence of strongly overlapping knowledge 
elements (i.e., the shared beliefs of Lyles and Schwenk 1992) may, of course, reduce 
such costs.   
 In sum, we see firm (MNC) knowledge structures as being composed of 
knowledge elements, which may be characterized in a number of dimensions, such 
as their sources, and connections between these, which may be conceptualized in 
terms of complementarities.  Net benefits depend on the costs of governing and 
transferring knowledge in order to realize complementarities.   
 This is a fundamentally simple framework; however, it is descriptively richer 
than most other discussions. It is also quite flexible; for example, it covers both the 
transfer of existing knowledge and the creation of new knowledge, since both may be 
analyzed as complementarities (i.e., as additive/sequential and complex 
complementarities, respectively). It is entirely consistent with, but adds to, the basic 
perspective in recent work on the differentiated MNC  namely that MNC units 
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control heterogeneous stocks of knowledge, and that the MNC may obtain 
competitive advantages from orchestrating knowledge flows between units in such a 
way that knowledge is transferred to where it will increase value-added. However, 
we explicitly identify those dimensions along which the MNC knowledge structures 
may be classified.  This allows us to add insight into the nature of the decision 
problem faced by MNC management. 
 Under norms of rationality, MNC management wishes to maximize net 
benefits.  Looking only at knowledge transfer, this translates into maximizing the 
difference between the expected (gross) benefits from transferring knowledge, as 
determined by complementarity, and the expected costs of such transfer, as 
determined by the governance and transfer costs, which in turn is influenced by 
knowledge characteristics such as tacitness, overlap, public good properties, etc.  As 
we argued,  this is usually cast in terms of choosing those organizational 
arrangements  that is, governance and transfer mechanisms  that minimize the 
relevant costs of undertaking transactions (i.e., transfer) involving knowledge with 
given characteristics (e.g. Kogut and Zander 1993).  The possibility of a reverse 
causality, in which organizational arrangements are chosen so that they influence the 
relevant characteristics, is not inquired into.  This is because most of the emphasis in 
the literature is placed on flows of knowledge with given characteristics between 
MNC units, and little analytical attention is devoted to analyzing the knowledge 
elements in terms of their characteristics and  interdependencies.  Therefore, the 
possibility that the costs and benefits of MNC knowledge management may be 
managed by influencing the characteristics and composition of knowledge elements 
in MNC units  that is, changing the MNC knowledge structure  is neglected (see 
Forsgren, Petersen and Foss 1999; Foss and Pedersen 2002 for exceptions).  However, 
this is exactly the possibility that we shall investigate in the following as the key 
illustration of the added insights of adopting a knowledge structure approach to the 
MNC.  
Developing and Transferring Knowledge as Key Managerial Decision Problems 
 Although it is very often argued in the literature that the MNC owes its 
existence to its superior ability (relative to markets) to transfer knowledge and that 
this superior ability may at the same time be a source of competitive advantage 
(relative to purely domestic firms), it is also widely recognized that the resource costs 
of developing and transferring knowledge may often be substantial. With respect to 
the transfer of knowledge, Teece (1981) estimated that transfer costs for the intra-
MNC technology transfer cases he examined ranged from 2, 24 percent to 59 percent 
with a mean of 19,16 percent.  In the view of Kogut and Zander (1993: 630) “… these 
costs are derived from the efforts to codify and teaching complex knowledge to 
recipient.”6 On the other hand, the benefits from transferring knowledge are often 
                                                 
6  Similarly, Szulanski (1996) showed that his findings imply that the barriers to knowledge transfer 
were only to a very small extent motivational (at least in the sense of, for example, agency theory).  
Rather, the barriers to knowledge transfer had to do with causal ambiguity, the receiver’s 
absorptive capacity and the general atmosphere in the relation between sender and receiver. 
However, his findings did not relate to the context of cross-border knowledge transfer. 
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very substantial, as indicated by, for example, Subramaniam and Venkatraman’s 
(2001) finding that transnational product development capability is highly dependent 
upon the transfer of knowledge in MNCs.  
 Thus, the costs and benefits of developing, transferring, codifying, teaching, etc. 
knowledge are quite substantial.  This suggests that it may be rational for MNC 
management to do more than maximize net benefits from exploiting 
complementarities between existing MNC knowledge elements and choosing those 
organizational arrangements that minimize the costs of transfer and governance 
associated with those given knowledge elements.   MNC management will also seek 
to control the determinants of those benefits and costs. It will try to influence the 
characteristics of the knowledge elements, such as the sources of subsidiary 
knowledge. As stated earlier we assume that management will choose organizational 
instruments, influencing knowledge sources, so as to maximize the net benefits of 
knowledge transfer.   This main argument is summarized in figure 2:  
XXXXXXXX Insert Figure 2 Here XXXXXXXX 
However, in spite of their obvious theoretical importance, rather little is known 
empirically about the determinants of intra-MNC knowledge flows7 in spite of some 
attention to knowledge characteristics (e.g., Hamel 1991; Kogut and Zander 1993; 
Simonin 1999), organizational controls, and motivational factors (Gupta and 
Govindarajan 1991, 1995).  The next sections consider the knowledge sources of MNC 
subsidiaries and organizational instruments in some detail and discuss their 
implications for the transfer of knowledge in MNCs.   
Sources, Characteristics and Transfer of Knowledge 
 As a general matter, impediments to knowledge transfer may be classified as 
either motivational or cognitive barriers  (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Zander and 
Kogut 1995; Gupta and Govindarajan 2000).  In this section, we are primarily taken 
up with cognitive barriers to transfer, reserving motivational factors for later 
treatment.  Cognitive barriers to transfer are usually conceptualized in terms of such 
constructs as causal ambiguity, complexity, tacitness, absorptive capacity, and the 
like.  Although they make perfect theoretical sense, these variables may be hard to 
operationalize and measure.8  A more operational approach is to start directly from 
the sources of subsidiary knowledge and argue that these sources result in knowledge 
with different characteristics.  Given this, sources of knowledge may be treated as 
                                                 
7   Thus, Crossan and Inkpen (1994: 271) point out that “… while much of the MNC research has dealt 
with static theories of the firm and investigations of structural questions, very little research has 
delved into the process of knowledge transfer and the barriers to successful intraorganizational 
learning.” And as late as in 2000, Gupta and Govindarajan (2000: 474) observed that with some 
notable exceptions (e.g., Zander and Kogut 1995), “… very little systematic empirical investigation 
in the determinants of intra-MNC knowledge transfers has so far been attempted.”  See also 
Buckley and Carter (1999: 81) for similar observations.  
8   Although successful attempts do exist, for example,. Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Kogut and Zander 
1993; Simonin 1999; Gupta and Govindarajan 2000. 
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choice variables, so that under norms of managerial rationality, the MNC wide 
development and transfer of knowledge is optimized through the choice of 
knowledge sources (and organizational controls and motivation).   
 Although an internal element necessarily enters into the production of all 
subsidiary knowledge, it makes sense to distinguish between the following types of 
knowledge, derived from different knowledge sources:  
1) Internal knowledge  that is, knowledge that is produced mainly through 
investing in the internal production of knowledge (e.g., much R&D).   
2) External knowledge  that is, knowledge that is to a large extent created on the 
basis of knowledge inputs from relations to external partners (customers, 
suppliers, etc.) or on the basis of knowledge inputs from a local cluster (e.g., a 
well educated work force, high quality research institutions, etc.).  
 The first category of knowledge is the kind of internal knowledge that has been 
highlighted in resource- and knowledge-based theories of the firm (Foss 1997).  In 
this literature, the focus has been on production and organization knowledge that is 
embodied in bundles of routines of a highly tacit and social nature. Teams of 
individuals operate it for some strategic purpose.  Because of its characteristics, such 
knowledge is strongly intertwined with the organization itself and is therefore hard 
(very costly) to trade in the market.  It may, however, be transferable at much lower 
cost inside the MNC network than across markets, particularly to the extent that 
internal knowledge is developed within the core of the MNC knowledge structure 
and is developed explicitly as a complement to other knowledge elements in the 
MNC network.  This leads us directly to the conventional argument for the existence 
of the MNC, which asserts that MNCs exist because of their comparative advantages 
(vis-a-vis markets) of transferring knowledge. Though arguably correct, that 
argument fails, however, to distinguish between the transfer of knowledge that 
differs in terms of sources.9  In contrast, we argue that the ease of transfer of 
knowledge is likely to be influenced by the sources of the knowledge. 
 Of course, no knowledge is entirely internally accumulated (Nohria and Eccles 
1992; Foss and Eriksen 1995; Kogut 2000); in fact, as we later elaborate, there may be 
significant relations of complementarity between internal and external knowledge 
sources.  Nevertheless, it makes conceptual and empirical sense to say that some 
knowledge is largely internally produced, while some other knowledge is strongly 
based on external knowledge inputs.  Conceptually, one may distinguish between 
two external sources of knowledge that may be available to subsidiary firms.  The 
first category may be called “network-based knowledge.” We here have in mind the 
gaining of knowledge from long-lasting interaction with specific external parties, 
notably customers or suppliers, and the use of that knowledge in the firm’s activities 
                                                 
9  Of course, the literature has introduced distinctions between, for example, R&D capabilities and 
marketing capabilities. However, this doesn’t go to the heart of the matter of the sources of 
knowledge. 
 
  
(Ford 1990).10 The second category may be called “cluster-based knowledge.” This 
kind of external knowledge is not to the same extent the result of long-lasting 
interaction with specific parties. Rather, it is based upon knowledge inputs from, for 
example, an well-educated work force or local knowledge institutions, such as 
technical universities, etc. (Porter 1990; Porter and Sölvell 1999).   Here, we treat both 
categories as one, namely as “external knowledge.”  
 Our distinction between internal and external sources of knowledge in the 
subsidiary knowledge base is different from the conventional distinction between, 
for example, production, marketing or R&D knowledge; the latter types of 
knowledge may all in principle have both internal and external components, to 
varying degrees.  The advantage of our distinction is that it may be more plausibly 
discussed in terms of general characteristics of knowledge than the activity-based 
definitions of knowledge.  For example, it is hard to argue on apriori grounds that, for 
example, production knowledge is inherently more complex, ambiguous or tacit, and 
therefore harder to transfer, than marketing knowledge. In contrast, we consider it 
more justified to make this kind of arguments with respect to our distinction, 
although with considerable cautiousness.  
 Sidestepping motivational issues, the success of knowledge transfer is primarily 
a matter of cognitive matters, such as the existence and richness of transmission 
channels (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989; Ghoshal, Korine and Szulanski 1994), the 
characteristics of the transferred knowledge in terms of such dimensions as tacitness, 
ambiguity, etc. (Zander and Kogut 1995; Szulanski 1996), and the absorptive capacity 
of the target unit(s) (Gupta and Govindarajan 2000).  We submit that these cognitive 
dimensions are systematically related to knowledge sources.  Therefore, knowledge 
transfer depends on knowledge sources (i.e., an important aspect of knowledge 
structure), which  we have argued  may be influenced by MNC management by 
organizational means.   
 With respect to how knowledge transfer is dependent upon knowledge sources, 
we argue that internal knowledge is likely to be more easily transferable than 
external knowledge, fundamentally because it is more likely to have many 
overlapping elements with other parts of the MNC knowledge structure and is more 
likely to be at least partly developed through interaction with other MNC units. 
Internally accumulated knowledge may be relatively easily transmitted through 
existing transmission channels, and although it may contain, for example, tacit 
elements, the absorptive capacity of target units is likely to be relatively high. 
Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 1: Internal subsidiary knowledge will be positively correlated with 
knowledge transfer from subsidiaries to other MNC units.   
                                                 
10  For example, Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) examine Toyota’s production network, and argue that 
Toyota’s ability to create, manage and take advantage of network-based knowledge flows is a 
strong explanation for the many productivity advantages enjoyed by Toyota (as well as its 
suppliers). 
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In contrast, external knowledge which tends to be of a more peripheral character in 
the MNC knowledge structure, is likely to be less easily transferable than internal 
knowledge.  This is because this type of knowledge is to a large extent derived from 
specific, perhaps very specific, problems and needs of the external parties with which 
the subsidiary interacts, and/or it consists of knowledge of local skill levels, tastes, 
regulatory authorities, etc., much of which may be hard to transfer or of no or little 
use for other MNC units.  External knowledge thus largely lies outside of the core of 
the MNC knowledge structure.  Therefore, it contains many elements that makes it 
hard to transfer to other MNC units.11  In fact, we argue that the more a subsidiary is 
prone to accumulate external knowledge, the less knowledge will it transfer to other 
MNC units. Given the above discussion, we can put forward the following 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: External subsidiary knowledge will be negatively correlated with intra-
MNC knowledge transfer, because external knowledge is not (or only weakly) 
complementary to knowledge in other MNC units.  
However, a key point of the literature on the differentiated MNC is that important 
knowledge may develop in what we call the periphery of the MNC knowledge 
structure - knowledge that when transferred and combined with complementary 
knowledge in other MNC units will yield a high value-added.   However, in order 
for such knowledge to be transferable and combinable with complementary 
knowledge in other MNC units, it has to be interpreted and formulated in such a 
way that it will be accessible to other units.  In terms of the distinction between 
external and internal knowledge, this may be accomplished by bringing external 
knowledge in more direct contact with internal knowledge.  Remember that we have 
defined internal knowledge to also include knowledge developed in the interaction 
between MNC units, that is, as also including the “codes” (Arrow 1974) through 
which communication may take place, and to include more core knowledge than 
peripheral knowledge.   Thus, we are not denying a key point of the literature on the 
differentiated MNC, but rather refining it.   Given this, we can put forward our third 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: When brought in contact with internal knowledge, external knowledge 
is highly correlated with knowledge transfer from subsidiaries to other MNC units. In 
more formal terms, the interaction effect between internal and external knowledge is 
positively correlated with knowledge transfer from subsidiaries to other MNC units.  
                                                 
11  This is admittedly somewhat counter-intuitive, since it may be argued that some kinds of external 
knowledge may be less characterized by tacit elements than internal knowledge. For example, 
knowledge inputs from local universities may have a high explicit knowledge content.  However, 
knowledge inputs from local universities may constitute a rather small part of cluster knowledge, 
given that the tendency in most MNCs is to source this kind of inputs in centrally placed R&D 
departments and not in local subsidiaries (Gassman and von Zedtwidtz 1999).  Moreover, the 
emphasis is not so much on tacit knowledge as a barrier of transfer as on whether the relevant 
knowledge lies within the core of the MNC knowledge structure.  Tacit knowledge may lie within 
this core. 
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Because internal and external knowledge are associated with different costs of 
transfer (different degrees of complexities and different tacit knowledge content) and 
with different complementarities, MNC management will influence the sources of 
knowledge that subsidiaries tap into in such a way that net benefits are maximized. 
However, influencing these sources through, for example, locational decisions, is not 
the only means of optimizing the accumulation and transfers of knowledge that is 
available to MNC management.  It can also make use of mechanisms of 
organizational control and motivation.  
 A basic organizational problem is to motivate the subsidiary to actually transfer 
knowledge that may be useful to other subsidiaries.  One problem concerns who 
should bear the resource costs of transferring knowledge, and how the party who 
“gives up” knowledge is to be compensated. We shall abstract from this problem, 
and assume that the subsidiaries and the headquarters through structuring 
compensation in the right way can handle it.  A rather different motivational 
problem is that to the extent that a subsidiary possesses a knowledge monopoly it 
controls a lever of bargaining power in the MNC, since it controls a crucial 
complementary asset (Hart 1995).  Transferring knowledge is tantamount to giving 
up this power (Forsgren, Pedersen and Foss 1999; Holm and Pedersen 2000b).  Gupta 
and Govindarajan (2000) briefly point to such a problem. Foss and Pedersen (2001) 
argue that repeated know how exchange may act as a mechanism that keeps this 
bargaining problem at bay. In this paper, as in Foss and Pedersen (2001), we deal 
with subsidiaries that are involved in lengthy relations with headquarters and other 
subsidiaries and, hence, engage in repeated interaction with these. Thus, we believe 
it is justified to assume that in fact subsidiaries will be motivated to transfer 
knowledge.  However, one point that has not been dealt with concerns the 
organizational mechanisms of control and motivation that may be applied, not just to 
the transfer of knowledge, but also to the development of knowledge. 
Organizational Instruments and the Development of Knowledge in Subsidiaries 
  Many contributions to the MNC literature recognize that the process of 
knowledge transfer is likely to be supported by different organizational means of 
control and motivation (e.g., Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989; Gupta and Govindarajan 
1991, 1995; Buckley and Carter 1999). Indeed, a key theme in many recent 
contributions is that interdependencies (complementarities) between knowledge 
flows strongly condition the choice of types of management systems and processes 
for managing subsidiary relations (e.g., Gupta and Govindarajan 1995).  
 We agree with the basic thrust of this literature.  However, we add two points.  
First, the choice of organizational mechanisms of control and motivation also 
influence the accumulation of knowledge in the sense that the application of different 
mechanisms lead to different kinds of knowledge being accumulated.  Second, 
causality may go in the reverse direction in the sense that the choice of organizational 
mechanisms of control and motivation also influence the transferability of 
knowledge.  Consider these points in turn.   
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 The knowledge structure of the MNC contains shared elements as well as local 
elements (in the sense of Hayek 1945), for example, knowledge about local tastes, 
technologies, regulators, suppliers, etc. In order to efficiently utilize the local 
elements of the knowledge, it will often be necessary to delegate rights to make 
decisions that involve such local knowledge to those decision-makers that best know 
how to turn the relevant knowledge to productive uses.   Along such lines, it may be 
argued that granting more decision rights to a MNC subsidiary  giving it more 
autonomy  improves the incentives of the subsidiary to engage in the accumulation 
of local knowledge (cf. Aghion and Tirole 1997).  Local knowledge is more likely to 
be of the external kind than of the internal. If subsidiary knowledge is mainly based 
on external knowledge, it is hard for MNC headquarters and top-management to 
direct the subsidiary’s acquisition of such knowledge because of the knowledge 
asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling 1992) and because the subsidiary is distant from 
the core in the knowledge structure.  Thus, stimulating the development of external 
knowledge in a subsidiary  for example, in the hope of increasing local marketing 
and product development  may involve granting a high degree of autonomy to the 
subsidiary.  This leads to our fourth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4:  The development of external knowledge in MNC subsidiaries is 
positively influenced by the degree of autonomy granted to the subsidiary. 
 In contrast to external knowledge, internal knowledge is produced mainly 
through investing in the internal production of knowledge (e.g., much R&D) or from 
learning by doing, using, etc. in the subsidiary itself, or developed through 
interaction with other units in the MNC network.  The emphasis is on developing 
knowledge that is at least potentially transferable.  Such knowledge will typically lie 
within the core of the MNC knowledge structure.  Also, the accumulation of internal 
knowledge in a subsidiary will strongly reflect perceived complementarities with 
knowledge elements in other parts of the MNC; more precisely, developing such 
knowledge takes place with an eye to these potential benefits.  Thus, we put forward 
the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 5: Developing internal knowledge in MNC subsidiaries are positively 
influenced by the perceived interdependencies (complementarities) between the 
focal subsidiary and other MNC units. 
Further, the development of internal knowledge is likely to be stimulated by the 
transfer of goods and/or services between MNC units.  This is because the transfer of 
goods and/or services, that is, intra-MNC trade, is in itself a force pulling in the 
direction of a widening of the bandwidth of communication channels. This prompts 
the discovery of new opportunities for realizing complementarities between 
knowledge components (Kirzner 1973). Thus: 
Hypothesis 6: Developing internal knowledge in MNC subsidiaries is positively 
influenced by the amount of trade between the focal subsidiary and other MNC units. 
The hypotheses are summarized in the following model. 
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XXXXXX Insert Figure 2 here XXXXXX 
 
 
III. Data and Method 
Data Collection 
 The data for this paper were collected as part of the Centres of Excellence-
project that engaged researchers in the Nordic countries, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Austria, Italy, Portugal and Canada.  The CoE-project was launched in 
May 1996 with the purpose of investigating headquarter-subsidiary relationships 
and the internal flow of knowledge in MNCs.  In order to collect comparable 
quantitative data on acquisition of subsidiary knowledge, it was decided to construct 
a questionnaire that could be applied in all the involved countries. After several 
project meetings and extensive reliability tests of the questionnaire on both 
academics and business managers, this was accomplished.12 
 For practical reasons, it was decided that each project member should be 
responsible for gathering data on foreign-owned subsidiaries within their own 
country. Thus, all subsidiaries in the database belong to MNCs. In the data gathering, 
subsidiary managers, rather than headquarters, have been respondents. One 
advantage of choosing subsidiary respondents is that they are directly engaged in the 
market and therefore are more acquainted with its characteristics. Although we can 
expect that the subsidiary have a reliable awareness of its own competencies, it 
would be an advantage to gather information on intra-MNC knowledge flows from 
other corporate units as well. However, it would be an unmanageable task first to 
identify the subsidiaries in each country and then to identify the relevant 
management units in the foreign MNCs.   
 The paper is based on empirical data from seven countries: Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden and the UK. All countries are located in the 
northern part of Europe, and the four Nordic countries are considered to be 
relatively small, while Germany and the UK are among the largest in Europe. 
Approximately 80 per cent of the questionnaires were answered by subsidiary 
executive officers, while financial managers, marketing managers or controllers in 
the subsidiary answered the remaining 20 per cent. The response rate varies between 
20 (UK) and 55 per cent (Sweden), depending on the country of investigation. The 
quality of the data is quite high with a general level of missing values of not more 
than 5 per cent.  
 XXXXXXXX Insert Table 1 Here  XXXXXXXX 
 As shown in table 2, the total sample covers information on 2.107 subsidiaries. 
It comprises all kinds of subsidiaries in all fields of business. Between countries, the 
                                                 
12 For more information on the CoE-project, see Holm and Pedersen (2000a). 
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sample ranges from 202 (UK) to 530 (Sweden). With the exception of Sweden, the 
size of the sample is rather similar in the other six countries. The average number of 
employees in the subsidiaries is 742 and the median is 102. Within the five smaller 
countries, the average size of the subsidiaries are very similar, while Germany and 
UK  due to their larger market sizes  comprise substantially larger subsidiaries. 
As we expect larger subsidiaries to comprise more knowledge and therefore more 
potential for knowledge transfer we need to control for this bias in the data material 
when conducting our tests of the hypotheses.  
 For all these subsidiaries are covered information on the level of subsidiary 
competencies, the sources of this competence, organizational context variables, and 
to what extent the knowledge has been transferred to other MNC-units. The 
subsidiaries were asked to indicate the level of competence for six different activities 
performed by the subsidiary on a seven-point Likert scale, from 1=very weak 
competence to 7=very strong competence. The six activities are research (basic and 
applied), development (of products and processes), production (of goods and 
services), marketing and sales, logistics and distribution and purchasing. The 
average score on the seven-point scale of the level of competence is shown in table 3.  
 XXXXXXXX Insert Table 2 HereXXXXXXXX 
In general, the subsidiaries are indicating that they comprises a relatively high level 
of competence for all activities with average values ranging from 4 to 6 in the upper 
level of the seven-point scale. The pattern is very similar for all the six countries with 
the highest competence levels for production and marketing/sales and somewhat 
lower levels for the four other activities. As expected, the larger German and UK 
subsidiaries have higher competence levels than the other subsidiaries in the sample. 
They have slightly higher values than the total sample for all six activities.  
Measures 
 All data were collected through the questionnaire and most variables are multi-
item measures that  were measured using seven-point Likert scales. However, items 
such as the number of employees were measured using actual values. The following 
sections provide the exact wording used for questionnaire items. 
 Knowledge transfer. Following, Foss and Pedersen (2002) our definition of 
knowledge transfer captures the application rather than the transfer per se of the 
subsidiary knowledge in other MNC units. Accordingly, in the questionnaire the 
subsidiaries have been asked to what extent the subsidiary knowledge has been of 
use to other MNC units. Respondents have indicated this on a seven-point Likert 
scale, where 1 was defined as “to no use at all for other units” and 7 was defined as 
“very useful for other units” for all the six above-mentioned activities. Knowledge 
transfer is a multi-item construct calculated as the average score reported by 
respondents across these six items (Alpha=0.74). 
 Internal knowledge. The construct of internal knowledge is capturing both the 
subsidiaries own effort of knowledge production and the knowledge developed 
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through interaction with other MNC units. The subsidiaries own knowledge 
production was measured by asking respondents to assess the level of investments in 
the subsidiary in the past three years, where 1=very limited, 7=substantial. The level 
of investments was assessed for all the six above-mentioned activities. In order to 
measure the knowledge developed through interaction with other MNC units the 
respondents was asked to assess the impact of various internal organizations on the 
development of the subsidiary's competencies, where 1=no impact at all, 7=very 
decisive impact. Three organizations were identified: internal MNC customers, 
internal MNC suppliers, and internal MNC R&D units. In the models used to test our 
hypotheses we use a composite measure, Internal knowledge, based on the average 
across all nine items (Alpha=0.73). 
 External knowledge. The variable of external knowledge is capturing both the 
importance of external counterparts (like customers and suppliers) and the local 
cluster as sources of knowledge development in the subsidiary. The inputs from 
external partners was measured by asking respondents to assess the impact of 
various external organizations on the development of the subsidiary's competencies, 
where 1=no impact at all, 7=very decisive impact. Four organizations were 
identified: external market customers, external market suppliers, specific distributor 
and specific external R&D unit. Building on the elements of Porter's (1990) diamond 
model, respondents were asked to assess the business environment in which they 
compete along the following dimensions: Availability of business professionals; 
availability of supply material; quality of suppliers; level of competition; government 
support; favorable legal environment; and existence of research institutions (1=very 
low, 7=very high). In the diamond model, the items are presented as different 
dimensions, however, Porter's (1990) own emphasis on the holistic nature of the 
model and the high inter-correlation between many of the items motivated us to 
construct a composite index. External knowledge is calculated as the average score 
reported by respondents across these eleven items (Alpha=0.68).   
 Interdependence (Complementarity). This variable measures the extent to 
which the MNC units are dependent on the subsidiaries and vice versa. The MNC 
dependence on the subsidiary knowledge were assessed by asking the respondents 
the following question: “What would be the consequences for other units in the 
Foreign Company if they no longer had access to the competencies of the 
subsidiary?”  (1=no consequences, 7=very significant consequences). In a similar 
vein, the subsidiary dependence on knowledge from other MNC units was captured 
by the following question: “What would be the consequences for the subsidiary if it 
no longer had access to the competencies of other MNC units?”  (1=no consequences, 
7=very significant consequences). Taken together these two items reflects the 
interdependence between the focal subsidiary and other MNC units.  
 Intra-MNC trade. The level of intra-MNC trade is an indicator of the breadth of 
the internal trade links. It is measured as a single item, as the share of subsidiary sale 
going to other MNC units in 1996. The subsidiary sale to other MNC units includes 
both semi-products and final goods and services. 
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 Autonomy. Based on the scale developed by Roth and Morrison (1992), 
respondents were asked to identify the level at which certain decisions were made, 
where 1=foreign corporate (HQ), 2=sub-corporate (e.g. division), 3=subsidiary level. 
Decisions were as follows: Hiring top subsidiary management; entering new markets 
within the country; entering foreign markets; changes to subsidiary organization; 
introduction of new products/services; approval of quarterly plan/schedules. Our 
measure, Autonomy, is based on the average of these six items (Alpha=0.61). 
 Controls. To control for structural characteristics of the subsidiary that might 
also influence the extent of knowledge transfer, we controlled for the following 
factors: Number of subsidiary employees in 1996 (a proxy for size), its mode of 
formation (a dummy: greenfield or acquisition), and the host country of the 
subsidiary (six dummies: using UK as a base case). We expect that larger subsidiaries 
will be more likely to transfer knowledge to other MNC units, consistent with our 
theoretical arguments of a cumulative process of knowledge development in foreign 
subsidiaries. We have no predictions on the role of entry mode and the country 
dummies for the extent of knowledge transfer. 
  
IV. Results 
Tests of Hypotheses  
 The six hypotheses may be summarized in three basic models as follows.
  
1) Internal knowledge =  Interdependencies + Intra-MNC trade + Error 
2) External knowledge  =  Autonomy + Error 
 
3) Transfer of knowledge =  Internal knowledge + External knowledge  + Internal 
knowledge*External knowledge + Controls + Error 
 
Hypotheses 1-3 are reflected in model 3, while hypothesis 4 is expressed in model 2, 
and, finally, hypotheses 5-6 are expressed in model 1. However, since the above 
models represent decisions that are interdependent (they have to be considered 
jointly), the use of single equation models may yield biased results and obscure 
interesting theoretical possibilities. Since the above models are interdependent, then 
it is possible that the joint optimization of all involved decisions may lead to 
suboptimization of one or more individual decisions. Statistically the 
interdependence might be reflected in that error terms of the three models are 
somehow correlated. Hence the correct model to estimate these decisions is a 
simultaneous equation model as three-stage least square, that circumvent the 
problem of interdependence by using instrument variables (often the exogenous 
variables) to obtain predicted values of the endogenous variables (in our case: 
knowledge transfer, internal knowledge, and external knowledge).  
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 We have applied the three-stage least square regression techniques (3SLS) with 
instrument variables to test all six hypotheses simultaneously. All the exogenous 
variables (interdependencies, intra-MNC trade, autonomy, subsidiary employees, 
mode of formation, and country dummies) are used as instrument variables in the 
estimation of the model. The result of the total model is reported in Table 4. Numbers 
in parentheses represent standard errors. 
XXXXXXXX  Insert Table 1 Here XXXXXXXX 
 Overall, the system of the three equations (models) works well with a system 
weighted R-square of 0.44. This indicates that almost half of the observed variation in 
the extent of knowledge transfer is explained by the variables in the model.  We turn 
now to the tests of our explanatory hypotheses. 
 Starting backwards with hypotheses 5 and 6, recall that they posited a 
relationship between the interdependence and intra-MNC trade and internal 
knowledge development. These hypotheses are tested in the first equation and they 
are strongly supported.  Both organizational decision variables have a significantly 
positive relationship with the development of internal knowledge (both at 1 per cent 
level). Hypothesis 4, on autonomy determining the development of external 
knowledge is also supported with a significant positive relationship, although only at 
5 per cent level. 
 Hypotheses 1-3 proposing that the development of internal and external 
subsidiary knowledge is facilitating the level of knowledge transfer are tested in the 
third equation. All three hypotheses are supported, indicating that development of 
internal knowledge has a positive effect (at the 1 per cent level), while the 
development of external knowledge has a direct negative impact (5 per cent level) on 
the transfer of knowledge to other MNC units. However, the interaction effect of 
internal knowledge and external knowledge has a strong positive (1 per cent level) 
relationship with the level of knowledge transfer. These results point to the 
conclusion that while internal knowledge have a direct and positive effect on 
knowledge transfer, the effect external knowledge is more indirect going through the 
interaction with internal knowledge, which might prove that external knowledge 
must be transformed from periphery to core knowledge before the knowledge 
transfer takes place. 
 The number of subsidiary employees turn out to be insignificant, while 
acquisitions do transfer more knowledge than green-fields to other MNC units 
(formation is significant). Recall that UK was used as a base case for the six country 
dummies, therefore the country dummies shows that subsidiaries from Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden are transferring significantly less knowledge to other MNC 
units than do the foreign owned subsidiaries hosted in UK (and Finland, Germany, 
and Austria). This might be explained by the small size of the Scandinavian markets 
and the location in the periphery of Europe.   
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V. Concluding Comments 
The present paper is essentially a contribution to the recent differentiated MNC 
literature on intra-MNC knowledge transfer.  However, it goes beyond this literature 
in a number of ways.  First, we have the methodological and theoretical arguments 
that the understanding of knowledge transfer between MNC units will be furthered 
by taking an explicit starting point in a conceptualization of the MNC as a 
knowledge structure.  We argued that such a conceptualization was at best implicitly 
present in existing literature. Therefore, there is no explicit, coherent view of what it 
means to say that the MNC is a knowledge-based entity.  This means that the extent 
tow which MNC management can “work on” the MNC knowledge structure may be 
under-appreciated in the literature.  As an illustration, the development, 
characteristics and transfer of knowledge are seldom consistently taken to be 
endogenous to organizational processes and arrangements. In the literature, it is 
rather the other way around. Organizational arrangements are seen as rational 
responses to the requirements implied by different characteristics of knowledge.   
 In contrast, we submitted that it is useful to conceptualize the decision problem 
of MNC management as a dynamic optimization problem in which it choose control 
variables (here, organizational instruments) to influence certain state variables (here, 
the creation and transfer of knowledge), the existing MNC knowledge structure 
forming the starting point for such an exercise.  In our operationalization of this 
overall, and far-reaching approach, we concentrated on how MNC management may 
influence the key characteristic of the MNC knowledge structure of the sources of 
subsidiary knowledge by means of organizational instruments.  We largely found 
support for the main argument of the paper that MNC management through choices 
regarding organizational control, motivation and context can influence the 
development, characteristics and transfer of knowledge. It was shown that 
organizational choice variables as the level of subsidiary autonomy (own decision-
making), level of intra-MNC-trade, and interdependence among the subsidiary and 
other MNC units all have a bearing on the development of different sources of 
subsidiary knowledge. 
 Furthermore, internally sourced knowledge has a direct positive effect, while 
externally sourced knowledge has a direct negative effect on subsidiary knowledge 
transfer. However, the indirect effect of externally sourced knowledge going through 
the interaction (and transformation) with internally sourced knowledge also has a 
positive effect on subsidiary knowledge transfer. This indicate that the extent that 
management chooses a specific way of sourcing knowledge, it also implicitly chooses 
the characteristics of the sourced knowledge and the ease with which it can be 
transferred inside the MNC. This is because knowledge from different knowledge 
sources has different characteristics and is thus transferred at different cost.  
 However, there are various problems with our approach that need to be briefly 
commented upon. First of all, the measures that proxy organizational means and 
context (Interdependence, Intra-MNC Trade, Autonomy) admittedly do so only 
rather imperfectly, and we would have preferred to have much more direct 
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measures.   For example, it is somewhat unclear what kind of organizational means 
or context the measure, Intra-MNC Trade exactly represents.  However, these are 
unavoidable limitations of the dataset.   
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Table 1 Sample size and subsidiary employees in the different countries 
 
COUNTRY SAMPLE SIZE SUBSIDIARY EMPLOYEES (mean) 
Austria 313 318 
Denmark 308 284 
Finland 238 200 
Germany 254 1.574 
Norway 262 130 
Sweden 530 244 
UK 202 3.787 
Total 2.107 742 
 
 
 28
  
 
Table 2 The average score on a seven-point scale of the level of competence. 
 
COUNTRY Research Development Production Marketing
/sales 
Logistics/ 
distribution 
Purchasing 
Austria 3.1 4.4 5.8 6.1 5.7 5.2 
Denmark 4.8 5.2 6.0 5.9 5.7 5.3 
Finland 4.3 4.9 5.9 5.9 5.5 5.3 
Germany 4.6 5.3 6.3 6.2 5.9 5.7 
Norway 4.2 4.9 5.6 5.7 5.3 5.2 
Sweden 4.7 5.3 5.9 5.9 5.5 5.2 
UK 4.9 5.3 6.1 6.1 5.9 5.5 
Total 4.4 5.1 6.0 6.0 5.6 5.3 
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Table 3: The three-stage least squares estimation 
of a simultaneous equation model. 
 
 Equations 
 INTERNAL 
KNOWLEDGE 
EXTERNAL 
KNOWLEDGE 
TRANSFER OF 
KNOWLEDGE 
Intercept      2.38 
    (0.06)*** 
         3.71 
        (0.08)*** 
         1.29 
        (1.43) 
Interdependence      0.10 
    (0.02)*** 
  
Intra-MNC trade      0.08 
    (0.01)*** 
  
Autonomy       
     
         0.09 
        (0.04)** 
 
Internal knowledge           
         
         0.99 
        (0.24)*** 
External knowledge           -1.33 
        (0.56)** 
Internal knowledge* 
External knowledge 
           0.28 
        (0.01)*** 
Employees         0.00002 
     (0.00002) 
Formation           0.26 
       (0.06)*** 
Country dummies: 
- Austria 
- Denmark 
- Finland 
- Germany 
- Norway 
- Sweden 
   
   0.32  (0.24)  
  -0.39  (0.13)*** 
0.10 (0.18) 
0.20 (0.26) 
  -0.50  (0.11)*** 
  -0.49  (0.11)*** 
      F-value 
      R-square 
      N 
      90.61*** 
       
      2056 
        2.30** 
         
        2056 
       73.40*** 
        0.44 
        2056 
 
***, ** and * = significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
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